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It is not the purposive but the rule-governed aspect of individual 
actions which integrates them into the order on which civilisation 
rests. 
 
(Hayek 1978, 85)  
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine connections between 
rationality and rule following, and to propose that a distinction between 
consequential and procedural interests can help us in explaining rule 
following behaviour. Simon (1955, 1978) maintains that when modelling 
rationality, more attention should be directed to the processes by which 
the actor arrives at choices — instead of preoccupying solely with the 
results of rational choice. Whatever methods the chooser is assumed to 
be using when rationally deciding upon an appropriate course of action, 
it appears that rules play a central role in such processes (e.g., search 
rules, threshold rules for defining satisficing levels, etc.). Limited or 
bounded rationality examined solely with respect to the consequences of 
rational choice remains as tautological as rationality in its omniscient 
version.   
Hayek’s (1952) theory of mind examines how the individual comes 
to perceive events in the first place. The general working properties of 
the mind and perception formation can clarify some central aspects of 
decision processes. Two ideas that become central to perception 
formation and decision making are: (1) perception is based on the 
categorising disposition of the mind and (2) perception formation requires 
constant (re)interpretation and interplay between accumulated categories 
and disclosing events.  
The notions of categorisation and interpretation become 
interesting when rationality is examined in connection with rule 
following. A preoccupation with the consequences of choices disregards 
the fact that choices are arrived at by the rule-following disposition of 
the mind. On the other hand, rule following as a behavioural mode 
requires interpretation which may in some cases be very similar to the 
comparative assessment of the consequences, as examined in the rational 
choice model. An approach called rule-individualism (Rowe 1989, Vanberg 
1994) aims at replacing ‘the logic of choice by a genuine theory of behaviour’ 
(Vanberg 1994, 7, emphasis in original). The present paper will maintain 
that rule-individualism remains preoccupied with the results of rational 
choice and therefore fails in its attempt to fulfil its goal.  
As a partial remedy to this problem, the present paper proposes a 
distinction between consequential and procedural interests in choice 
behaviour. If we allow the actor’s rational interest to be directed to the 
appropriateness of her action regarding the rules that she knows of, and 
to the interpretation of the behavioural recommendations of those rules 
in particular situations, her choice behaviour is no longer defined by the 
results of rational choice alone. Instead, choice behaviour is then better 
described by the procedural interest in finding an appropriate rule and 
interpreting its behavioural recommendation in a given situation. It 
should be noted that the distinction between procedural and 
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consequential interests in my treatment deviates from the idea that rule 
following is by definition based on procedural rationality whereas case-
by-case adjustment is defined by consequential considerations. As will be 
explained in the paper, rule following may be motivated by consequential 
interest (as in rule-individualism) as well as by procedural one.  
This paper is organised as follows: I start by discussing the notions 
of rationality and rule following. In the second section the central ideas 
of Hayek’s theory of mind will be presented. Section three deals with 
rule-individualism together with some logical problems it comprises. In 
section four the distinction between procedural and consequential 
interests will be discussed. Finally, section five will provide some 
concluding remarks.  
 
Rationality and rule following 
 
Rational choice theory (RTC) recommends forming explanations 
of social phenomena beginning with the individual’s choice behaviour 
which is viewed as being rational. Rationality manifests itself in the 
purposeful action of the individual. The unit of analysis is a choice made 
by an individual. The theory suggests that an individual will always 
choose an alternative that maximises her utility (or minimises her 
disutility) in any given situation (cf. Coleman 1990, 13-9). What these 
choices are about does not concern RTC as it is essentially about how 
well means are applied in the pursuit of ends, rather than defining the 
aims of individuals (Elster 1986, 1). An action can be said to be rational 
if the individual has reason to believe that her chosen course of action is 
the best means to attain whatever she is aiming at.  
As a general approximation rational choice is consequentially 
oriented in the sense that goodness of a choice is defined by the results it 
is expected to bring about. Also, rational choice is generally understood 
to concern case-by-case adjustment in separate choice situations. In the 
present use, case-by-case adjustment always refers to consequential 
considerations. By the term procedural rationality Simon is concerned with 
the lack of procedural consideration in rational choice. For Simon, 
procedural rationality means ‘the effectiveness, in the light of human 
cognitive powers and limitations, of the procedures used to choose 
actions’ (1978, 9). For epistemological reasons relating to limited reason 
and genuine uncertainty, the present approach does not maintain that we 
could, even in principle, demonstrate that rule following would be apriori 
a more effective behavioural mode than case-by-case adjustment — or 
vice versa. Quite the contrary, this paper will propose that the agent may 
be cognitively capable of switching between procedural and 
consequential considerations. Whether her interest is directed to either 
type is another issue.  
By directing attention to processes by which the agent comes to 
choose actions, Simon opens the door to the realm of rules. Rules can 
then enter decision-making models in various ways. For instance, it 
allows functional arguments of the type: if the agent follows a certain 
rule in a certain type of recurrent situation, then rule following in that 
type of situation must be an efficient response. Such an argument may, 
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however, have to deal with the efficiency of habitual behaviour. A 
problem with habitual behaviour is that it is in many ways a complete 
opposite to the general idea of rational behaviour, as it is unresponsive to 
situational particularities and devoid of conscious reflection by the 
decision maker. It seems that we cannot distinguish rule following as a 
behavioural regularity from case-by-case adjustment without, to some 
extent, relaxing the requirement for situational judgement (Vanberg 
1994, 33).  
Another way for rules to enter the process of choosing is implied 
in Hayek’s theory of mind (1952). All types of choice behaviour are 
based on the rule following disposition of the mind. Furthermore, all 
action, whether rule following or case-by-case adjustment requires 
interpretation. This implies that both rule following and case-by-case 
adjustment share the basic cognitive and behavioural requirements.  
 
Perception as a Process of Classification 
 
Rational choice theory describes the choice process as one that 
begins at the recognition of available alternatives, continues by the 
evaluation of their respective expected consequences and ends at 
choosing the most preferable option. It is, however, unable to explain 
how individuals acquire and use knowledge to pursue rational choice 
behaviour in the first place. A central implication of Hayek’s theory of 
mind (1952) is that every type of action, whether rule following or case-
by-case adjustment, is based on perception formation through the 
categorising disposition of the mind. The working properties of the mind 
can thus be specified as rule following. But if the rule-following 
disposition of the mind does not discriminate between case-by-case 
adjustment and rule following at the observable action level, then we 
need to search for an explanation of rule following as a behavioural 
regularity elsewhere.   
Central to Hayek’s theory of mind is the notion of interpretation. 
This notion is also important for the present discussion because it 
functions as a bridge between case-by-case adjustment and rule 
following. The central message of The Sensory Order is that every type of 
action, including rule following, requires constant interpretation. In the 
previous section it was discussed that action, in order to qualify as rule 
following, needs to be unresponsive toward the particularities of the 
situation the agent finds herself in. On the other hand, the agent faces a 
problem of choosing which rule to follow at particular types of 
situations. She has to interpret the situation even before a rule-following 
type of behaviour can commence.  
A problem with the idea of constant interpretation is that 
individuals seem to also follow rules which they are not conscious of. 
Rules do not necessarily exist in articulated forms (Hayek 1973), or even 
articulable forms (Hayek 1952). In such cases, interpretation becomes 
rather an innate process of the mind as the individual may remain 
unaware of any interpretative effort. This feature relates to an 
interpretation of rules as behavioural patterns or regularities of conduct 
(Hayek 1967, 66). If rules are viewed as observable recurrent patterns of 
4 
 
behaviour, the problem of constant interpretation does not arise. The 
only thing that counts then is the behaviour itself, not whether it is an 
outcome of unresponsiveness to the particularities of events or of some 
interpretive effort, or any combination of these two.  
Hayek’s theory suggests that what we can perceive are the recurring 
patterns of separate situations (1967, 23). What our mind is trying to 
figure out when we are faced with a new situation are elements that show 
some resemblance to those that we have experience of. We are trying to 
find possible connections between the elements of the situation we find 
ourselves in and the categories we have accumulated through experience.  
The human mind is, however, limited in the sense that we cannot 
go through the innumerable particularities of a new situation and 
compare them separately as an automaton with our cumulated 
experience to find common elements. The human mind is not developed 
to consider every detail in separate situations. The disposition of 
perceiving regularities, even though it facilitates the development of 
knowledge about causal connections between regularities, hinders us 
from perceiving any situation in its full detail.  
Pattern recognition is based on our ability to classify elements of 
events (Hayek 1952, s. 2.32−2.38). The ability to discern recurrent 
patterns arises from our ability to create categories of recurring elements 
in dissimilar events. The individual does not respond to separate 
situations as unique events (in absolute terms), but instead tries to 
classify their elements into certain types, based on the similarities that 
she can discern between the elements of the situation at hand and the 
categories accumulated by experience. Each perception is influenced by 
previous classifications. A new event is always perceived in association 
with the accumulated structure of elements with which it has something 
in common. If the elements of an event had no relation to any of the 
accumulated classes, the individual would remain unable to perceive the 
event in the first place. ‘If sensory perception must be regarded as an act 
of classification, what we perceive can never be unique properties of 
individual objects but always only properties which the objects have in 
common with other objects’ (Hayek 1952, 142).  
What is assumed to happen during classification and re-
classification processes is also important. Everything we perceive is 
related to previously accumulated classes. But also, any event contains 
the potential to create new and change existing classes. (Re)classification 
is thus a process where new events intertwine with existing categories. In 
order for the mind to be able to perceive order, the accumulated classes 
must modify perception of a new event more than the other way around. 
If this were not generally so, new events would continuously break down 
existing structure of classes and the individual would lose the ability to 
perceive order.  
Another interesting feature in the categorising process is the 
feedback mechanism between the individual and her environment. 
Environment is generally seems as providing the feedback to which the 
individual then adjusts her behaviour. The individual’s learning process is 
based on the method of trial and error (Hayek 1967, Popper 1972) where 
trials are hypotheses drawn upon experience and their selection is based 
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on partly subjective evaluation of their respective successes or failures to 
achieve what is aimed for. What separates the present approach to 
learning from an alternative interpretation of trial and error is that not 
only are the trials viewed as representing the individual’s subjective 
conjectures about causal connections, but also that the disclosing 
consequences are interpreted by the individual, and as the individual can 
perceive reality only through her subjective understanding, the degree of 
success or failure remains partly a subjective matter as well. This 
interpretation may have slightly different implications than an 
interpretation according to which real events work as the objective 
selection mechanism, discriminating between success and failure 
irrespective of the individual’s assessment.  
Classification is not necessarily a simple and straight forward 
process, however. An event may consist of elements that belong to more 
than one class at a time and they may also on different occasions be 
assigned to different classes depending on the accompanying elements 
(Hayek 1952, 50). Classification may thus be multiple in these two 
separate ways. Furthermore, classification may take place in sequences 
across different levels of the hierarchy of classes. One classification act 
may in turn become a subject to further classification, and so on (ibid., 
51).  
Hayek’s theory of mind suggests that experience is essential for 
any formation of perception, that perception is essentially a process of 
classification of recurrent elements. The behavioural disposition of rule 
following is thus present in the very elementary processes by which we 
make the world intelligible to us.   
 
Rule-individualism 
  
Rowe (1989) maintains that what he calls ‘act-individualism’, the 
behavioural description of rational choice theory, cannot explain socio-
economic regularities, such as rules and institutions. ‘If act-individualism 
were true, then social facts, social institutions, society, could not exist’ (p. 
4). This is because a self-interested maximiser would be unable to forego 
an opportunity to defect while others signal willingness to cooperate in 
mixed-motives situations presented in prisoner’s dilemma.  
Therefore, we will need an alternative behavioural theory to 
explain these regularities. For Rowe, the alternative is found in applying 
rational choice at the level of choices among rules of actions, instead of at 
the level of choices among actions themselves. ‘A rule of action is 
rational if, by following that rule, an agent maximizes his expected utility’ 
(Rowe 1989, 5). A single action cannot be judged rational as such, but 
only by considering to what extent it corresponds with a rule that is 
rational to follow. He concludes that ‘social institutions are in fact 
nothing more than agents rationally following rules of action, and being 
believed by other agents to do so’ (ibid.).  
Rowe’s rationale for rule following is based on an appealing idea 
for any rational choice theorist: if individuals are rational when buying 
and selling, then why should they not be rational in other activities, like 
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in choosing whether or not to follow a certain rule? He explains the 
basic logic of rational choice among rules as follows:  
 
Whereas act-individualism proposes a one-step test of rationality, the 
action being evaluated directly in terms of its consequences, rule-
individualism proposes a two-step test of rationality, the action being 
evaluated in terms of the rules to which it conforms, and the rule in 
turn being evaluated in terms of the consequences of following that 
rule (Rowe 1989, 23).  
 
Therefore, Rowe concludes that: 
 
[i]f the value to an agent of violating his rule exceeds the value to 
him of maintaining his reputation for following it, then he will violate 
that rule (Rowe 1989, 24) 
 
Vanberg (1994, 31-2) notices that Rowe’s rationality assumption is 
based on a kind of ‘second order’ case-by-case adjustment in the sense 
that the individual, instead of calculating which choice-option is rational 
to choose, calculates whether or not following a rule is rational. If 
violating a rule gives larger expected pay-offs than following that rule, 
then the individual will defect.  
Rowe’s view seems to introduce a logical problem: 
 
• Postulate 1: an action is rational only in so far as it is 
part of a rational rule of action – it is neither rational 
nor irrational in itself (Rowe 1989, 5).   
• Postulate 2: a rule of action is rational if, by following 
that rule, an agent maximizes his expected utility 
(ibid.).  
• Hypothesis: if the value to an agent of violating his 
rule exceeds the value to him of maintaining his 
reputation for following it, then he will violate that 
rule (ibid., 24).  
 
Insofar as postulate 1 holds, any action that is not part of a rational 
rule would be neither rational nor irrational. Violating a rational rule 
would then become neither rational nor irrational. As change in rules 
often requires a violation of some existing rule, a change in rules would 
then become neither rational nor irrational. If a change in rules becomes 
neither rational nor irrational, then rules themselves become neither 
rational nor irrational. Thus, the hypothesis seems inconsistent with 
postulate 1. The individual appears suddenly capable of defining 
rationality of an action that is not part of a rational rule.  
Vanberg (1994) has also adopted the term ‘rule-individualism’ to 
define the behavioural foundations of the individual. The individual is 
unable to calculate the best course of action in separate, dissimilar 
situations and therefore adheres to mental processes which are not 
analysed in rational choice theory. She can use her past experience and 
her categorising ability to make conjectures about the consequences of 
her choice-options. Individuals are ascribed with ‘the capability to learn 
from experience, and to adapt, over time, their repertoire of behavioural 
rules to relevant aspects of their environment’ (ibid., 29).  
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By definition, the goodness of rules cannot be judged by their 
performance in a single situation. Rule-following means that the 
individual gives up the desire to evaluate every choice situation as a 
separate and that she commits herself to the rule that has worked well in 
the past. This notion is not necessarily shared by all advocates of rule-
individualism, however. As above, e.g., Rowe (1989, 23) interprets that 
the meta-choice between case-by-case adjustment and rule following is a 
continuous case-by-case assessment process where the individual 
evaluates the potential outcomes of violating a rule against the past 
outcomes the rule has brought about.  
For Vanberg, the essence of rule following is not to calculate in 
every choice situation, but, to some extent, to remain unresponsive to 
the changing particularities (Vanberg 1994, 33). To say that an individual 
chooses to follow a rule would, therefore, mean that the individual 
basically possessed the capacity to evaluate situations case by case, but 
would voluntarily give up her calculative capacity. As Vanberg puts it, 
‘she would have to decide, by rational choice, not to be rational’ (ibid., 
34). Thus, for Vanberg, the individual does not seem to possess a 
capacity to switch between rule following and case-by-case adjustment at 
will.  
On the other hand, Vanberg views the rationale for rule following 
as being based on ‘some comparison among potential alternative general 
patterns of behaviour’ (1994, 17). To adopt a rule is then rational if it is 
expected to be more advantageous than an alternative strategy: 
 
We can view an individual’s adoption of a behavioural rule as being 
based on some comparison among potential alternative general 
patterns of behaviour. To adopt a rule in this sense can be considered 
‘rational’ if it is found to be a more advantageous strategy than 
potential alternatives, where attempting to maximize on a case by 
case basis can be viewed as one alternative. … In general it can be 
argued that adopting a rule for how to behave in certain types of 
situations is rational if rule-following can be expected to result in 
larger overall pay-offs (over a relevant period of time) than case by 
case adjustment. (Vanberg 1994, 17) 
 
An important question arises about whether or not the individual 
is, even in principle, able to recognise that rule following will be on 
balance advantageous compared to case-by-case adjustment. The logic of 
reasoning that I am interested in here is as follows: if the rationale for 
rule following is based on our cognitive limitations that preclude case-by-
case adjustment, then rule following describes choice behaviour in 
general. If, on the other hand, the individual is in fact able to pursue 
case-by-case adjustment but prefers to follow rules, then cognitive 
limitations alone do not provide the explanation for rule following.  
To find out whether complying with a particular rule is more 
advantageous than rule-violation in the long-term may be difficult for the 
individual to establish. The individual needs to evaluate and compare 
potential consequences of both rule following and rule-violation in order 
to know whether or not the former is on balance more advantageous. 
This then would indicate that the individual’s cognitive limitations do not 
explain rule following. A cognitive capacity is actually required in a 
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special sense to arrive at a rational choice to follow a rule. As the ‘very 
nature of rules implies that their “goodness” can only be judged by their 
performance over a longer sequence of applications’ (Vanberg 1994, 29), 
it becomes unclear how the individual, even in principle, could know 
when rule following is on balance more advantageous. This problem 
arises because if the individual has experience about following a rule, 
then she by necessity lacks the experience about the innumerable 
situations where she might have violated the rule. Any suggestion that 
she might know the latter cases (which have never been disclosed) fails 
to give a reasonable account of the fact that she does not even know the 
nature of the non-existent violations, that is, she does not know how 
precisely she might have chosen to violate the rule nor at what particular 
instant she might have done so, not to mention the possible 
consequences of doing so. The expected consequences of rule following 
can be viewed as being limitedly predictable, but only insofar as 
experiences from a rule have already been accumulated. But to claim that 
one can evaluate the consequences of future case-by-case adjustments or 
of those that might have taken place in the past would require mental 
capacities that are difficult to establish.  
On the other hand, Vanberg does not view rule following as 
necessarily providing better overall consequences than case-by-case 
adjustment:  
 
Following a rule rather than adjusting to the particular circumstances 
of each individual choice situation may involve a trade-off: the 
savings in decision making costs may have to be paid for by 
decreased overall ‘quality’ of choice-outcomes (Vanberg 1994, 18).  
 
Three different types of rationales for rule following have been 
considered here: (1) cognitive limitations, (2) overall advantageous 
consequences of rule following and (3) savings in decision-making costs. 
The question whether or not the consequences of rule following can be 
viewed as being, on balance, more advantageous than case-by-case 
adjustments, according to a chosen criterion of goodness, is problematic. 
One can resort to a functional claim that if a rule exists, then it must be 
more desirable (and in that sense more advantageous). But this rationale 
has the same kind of irrefutability character as is found in rational choice 
theory. Savings in decision-making costs are an obvious consequence of 
reduced decision-making. An open question remains, however, about 
how we can balance these savings with the reduction of the quality of 
outcomes of non-existent activities. This refers to the fact that if the 
actor decides to follow a rule, then she foregoes case-by-case adjustment 
and therefore cannot know the quality of outcomes that the numerous 
separate choice situations would have resulted in if they had been 
chosen. It should perhaps also be noted that the explanation based on 
overall advantageousness of rule following and the cost-reduction 
explanation are potentially conflicting. The cost-reduction explanation 
suggests that case-by-case adjustment would in fact give more 
advantageous outcomes than rule following, whereas the 
advantageousness explanation claims the opposite. Both of these 
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explanations are at odds with the cognitive limitations explanation. If the 
individual is viewed as being incapable of case-by-case adjustment in the 
first place, then it is difficult to see how case-by-case adjustment could 
be viewed as an available behavioural mode to which rule following 
should be compared.  
Cognitive limitations as a rationale for rule following introduces 
some interesting questions. A central question for the present paper is 
whether or not cognitive limitations discriminate between rule-following 
behaviour and case-by-case adjustment. This question arises insofar as 
the mental processes regarding both rule following and case-by-case 
adjustment are based on the same classification mechanism that is 
analysed by Hayek (1952).  
 
Procedural and consequential interests, and the 
cognitive capacity to switch between rule following 
and discretion. 
 
There seem to be at least two interesting questions open here. The 
first question concerns our cognitive capacity. Vanberg criticises the view 
according to which the rationale for rule following could be based on 
calculation, either at the level of choices among actions or at the level of 
choices among rules of actions. Both rational choice theory and Rowe’s 
version of rule-individualism are thus unsatisfactory in the light of the 
classification process advocated by Vanberg. Individuals follow rules 
precisely because they lack the capacity to evaluate separate situations in 
their full details. Even in a situation where the individual cannot find 
enough familiar elements to associate it with any already existing 
category, she uses the same experience-based classification process to 
establish a new tentative category. This is to say that when engaging in 
case-by-case adjustment, the individual is in fact using the same 
classifying process that rule following is based upon. Thus the 
classification act per se does not differentiate between rule following and 
case-by-case adjustment.  
The second question introduces some new features to the above 
discussion as it asks whether individuals also follow rules in types of 
situations where their cognitive capacities would not prevent them from 
case-by-case adjustment. If the answer is in the affirmative, then 
cognitive limitations do not provide full explanation for rule following 
either.  
Vanberg (1994, 33) views that rule following requires, to some 
extent, unresponsiveness toward the particularities of a situation. 
Unresponsiveness does not, however, necessitate the individual’s 
incapacity of evaluating a situation. Whether or not an individual is 
capable of case-by-case adjustment and whether or not she uses this 
capability are two different questions. However, being able to evaluate a 
situation but refusing to do is not an available option for Vanberg. ‘For a 
person to deliberately choose to follow a rule would require him/her to 
give up, by wilful choice, her capacity to calculate’ (ibid., 33-4).  
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The present paper takes a different perspective to this issue. The 
distinction between procedural and consequential interests may help to 
clarify why a person may completely rationally choose to follow a rule 
retaining her capacity to calculate. If the individual’s interest were 
assumed to be directed toward consequential assessment only, Vanberg’s 
position would be justified. But, if we permit the individual to have 
interest directed to the procedural assessment, the picture changes. A 
central point to my position is that rule following requires interpretation. 
The individual needs to decide which rule to apply in a particular 
situation and how to interpret its meaning. If that choice and 
interpretation are directed towards consequential issues, that is, to 
figuring out which rule provides the best expected outcome, the 
individual is not giving up her ability to calculate, but is comparing the 
expected benefits that alternative rules would bring about. In procedural 
assessment, the benefits are not derived from expected consequences of 
alternative rules but, instead, from the expected appropriateness of a rule 
in a given situation together with the interpretation of its meaning in that 
situation.  
Thus the individual does not give up her capacity to calculate; 
rather she is using that capacity motivated by the two types of interests, 
the procedural and the consequential. This perspective permits the 
possibility for the individual to switch between rule following and 
situational calculation in the sense that she is able to switch between 
procedural and consequential interests. This view fits well into the 
picture when we consider rule change. Changing rules requires some 
initial deviation or innovation. If the individual would only consider her 
procedural interests the whole time, rule change would occur as an 
unintended consequence due to the uncertainty of interpretation. 
Mistakes or variance in interpretation would give rise to new behavioural 
regularities. But insofar as the individual may in a situation where her 
action has previously been based on procedural consideration direct her 
interest toward alternative consequences, she may break the regular 
pattern and discover an entirely novel behavioural solution.  
  
Procedural interest and learning 
 
None of the foregoing approaches seems to provide a completely 
satisfactory explanation for rule following. Rational choice theory does 
not view the individual as a rule-following actor to start with. Rule-
individualism views choices among rules based on the same 
consequential assessment that is generally viewed as directing choices 
within rules. Categorising in Hayek’s theory of mind explains the 
formation of perception as a categorising activity, but it does not 
differentiate between rule following and discretion at the observable 
behavioural level.  
The aim of this section is to discuss how the individual may come 
to internalise procedural interest. It is proposed that insofar as rational 
contemplation is involved in the choice among rules, it may often owe 
more to the procedural than to consequential interests.  
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In his book Ulysses and Sirens (1979), Jon Elster suggests that 
individuals are not always fully rational. In the legend Odyssey, Ulysses, 
the king of Ithaca, has a potential dilemma during his journey. On the 
one hand, he would like to hear the call of the sirens, but on the other 
hand, he knows that nobody, after having heard their call, has been able 
to resist it and has thus been doomed to their spell for all eternity. 
Ulysses is aware of his limits of rationality and therefore designs a 
procedure that binds him (both literally and conceptually) to forego the 
undesirable action that otherwise would result in. He demands his crew 
to tie him to the mast and to block their ears so they are unable to hear 
his later commands.  
Elster (p. 39-46) provides the principles of precommitment of this 
type as follows: 
1. To bind oneself is to carry out a certain decision at 
time t1 in order to increase the probability that one 
will carry out another decision at time t2. 
2. If the act a the earlier time has the effect of inducing 
a change in the set of options that will be available at 
the later time, then this does not count as binding 
oneself if the new feasible set includes the old one. 
3. The effect of carrying out the decision at t1 must be 
to set up some causal process in the external world. 
4. The resistance against carrying out the decision at t1 
must be smaller than the resistance that would have 
opposed the carrying out of the decision at t2 had the 
decision at t1 not intervened. 
5. The act of binding oneself must be an act of 
commission, not of omission. 
 
Principle 3 disregards types of decisions that do not have 
behavioural effects, like decisions to decide. According to principle 5, the 
fact that the individual prefers not to leave a given state is not viewed as 
evidence that she would freely have entered that state from all of the 
states that are open to her.  
This type of precommitment can be viewed as rational within the 
framework suggesting that individuals are not fully rational. If individuals 
were fully rational precommitment would be unnecessary as the 
individual would be able to resist the later temptation to go against her 
‘true’ preferences. Precommitment of this type is based on the 
consequential assessment of alternatives, however. The actor already 
knows what to expect to happen is she fails to precommit herself.   
There may to be another type of precommitment going on in the 
choice behaviour as well. It was suggested earlier in this paper that a 
central problem in evaluating different rules is that the individual often 
remains unable to assess the consequential goodness of alternative rules 
because rules are difficult to assess by reference to outcomes that do not 
yet exist. The evolutionary view on rules suggests that rule assessment is 
essentially retrospective. Only afterwards can we assess whether a rule 
produced types of outcomes that we prefer. But even then, we 
necessarily lack the knowledge of general outcomes of other rules that 
were available at the time we made the choice.  
In the presence of ignorance about the comparative consequential 
efficiency of various behavioural alternatives the individual may direct 
her interest to the type of assessment that relates more to the 
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consideration of consistency of behaviour, that is, to the procedural 
assessment. Instead of asking what rule provides, on balance, the best 
average consequences, the individual may ask herself what would be the 
proper rule to apply in this situation, and how to interpret its behavioural 
recommendation. This is to say that a choice among rules that can be 
seen as rational contemplation may be based on the individual’s interest 
in the procedural justification.  
Due to epistemological problems concerning what we can know 
about rules and their outcomes, precommitment as a ‘meta’ rule is 
difficult to see as arising without social learning and interplay. Rawls’ 
(1971) social-psychological construction provides for the possibility of a 
shared set of values and conventions to emerge. Rawls suggests that 
individuals who have a sense of themselves as individuals, and for whom 
pluralism with respect to final ends among all individuals is the rule, the 
only means to arrive at a social contract is through their sense of justice. 
If a contract is to have expected behavioural effect the individuals need 
to commit themselves to follow the agreed terms. But before individuals 
are willing to invest in a discourse leading to a potential contract they 
need to have expectations on reciprocity by others. By learning to 
precommit the individual establishes a quasi-stable reference point 
making her, to some extent, unwilling to defect even when defection 
would result in more desirable outcomes.  
Chapter 8 of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice explores how and under 
what conditions a sense of reciprocity arises from more primitive 
affections. The analysis builds upon psychological theories about stages 
in the child’s development of moral attitudes. These theories suggest that 
sentiments of love and friendship, and the sense of justice itself, emerge 
from the experience of other people acting for our good. As a result of 
the learning process by which the child comes to recognise that others 
wish her well, she becomes precommitted to reciprocate in kind.  
This type of precommitment counterbalances the suggested 
rational disposition to unilaterally defect while others cooperate in 
prisoner’s dilemma situations. Precommitment as a quasi-stable reference 
point is tolerant towards experiences of defection by others. 
Precommitment is seen here as a more deeply rooted regularity than 
what can be considered a rational strategy in the reciprocal game of tit 
for tat (Axelrod 1984) which, as such, provides good reason to cooperate 
as well. Insofar as not all people defect all the time, precommitment may 
explain why people are willing to endure defection, contributing to a 
quasi-stable social order.  
 
Conclusions 
 
It seems that a behavioural theory that limits its inquiry to the pure 
logic of choice cannot provide an explanation for the formation of social 
phenomena, such as rules, institutions and organisations. For instance, 
the mixed-motives game of prisoner’s dilemma does not explain per se 
whether or not a cooperative pattern is reached and maintained. That is 
to say that the pay-off structure and the basic assumption that 
13 
 
individuals prefer better to worse do not suffice in providing an 
explanation of the emergence of a general behavioural pattern. As soon 
as other behavioural assumptions are introduced into the game, they 
seem to carry most of the explanatory burden. Assumptions of how 
much the players value e.g., the continuity of relations, trust, and 
reputation are pivotal to the outcome.   
Rule-individualism seems to explain the individual’s choice 
behaviour from the consequential perspective as well. The result is a 
second order rational choice among rules, or an emphasis on the 
cognitive limitations of the individual. But since we can observe that 
individuals engage in case-by-case adjustment as well, the cognitive 
limitations do not seem to explain rule following alone. Even though the 
individual’s cognitive capacity is limited, she uses that capacity to develop 
expectations of the consequences that alternative choice options provide. 
This paper has argued that a even though rule following may be partly 
motivated by consequential interest, the fact that the goodness of rules 
cannot be assessed as directly as is the case with separate choices within 
a framework of already existing rules directs the interest of the actor 
toward procedural considerations.  
Efficiency claims for or against case-by-case adjustment or rule 
following are problematic. If we can observe one type of behaviour the 
other type of response will necessarily be missing. To say that due to our 
limited reason rule following is an efficient response to genuine 
uncertainty is problematic as individuals do engage in action that can be 
described as case-by-case adjustment. If case-by-case adjustment is 
refuted by reference to, for instance, Hayek’s theory of mind which 
concludes that all kinds of action is based on the categorisation activity 
of the mind, then we can conclude that all types of action is rule 
following. But that would be a relabelling issue then.  
When it comes to the issue of when it would be rational to follow 
rules instead of attempting case-by-case adjustment, things remain 
problematic as well. Some like to think that in a highly uncertain 
environment, rules need to be flexible or broad in order to provide room 
for proper adjustment to sudden situational changes. What this view 
implies is that actors in a highly volatile environment favour case-by-case 
adjustment over rule following. The problem with this view is that 
humans seem to behave in exactly the opposite way. In an increasingly 
uncertain environment we tend to delimit the range of behavioural 
alternatives (Heiner 1983, Dosi et al. 1999). We apply more rigid and 
narrow behavioural rules when things get volatile. The reason is rather 
obvious: if both the environmental factors and the range of possible 
response alternatives became unlimited, we would lose our means of 
orientation.  
If efficiency here refers to proper response to environmental 
change, then both a broad and a limited rule may be treated as efficient. 
By increasing the number of possible adjustment alternatives a more 
flexible or broader rule would permit a ‘correct’ adjustment to take place, 
therefore qualifying the rule as efficient. And contrastingly, by limiting 
the range of possible response alternatives a more limited rule is an 
efficient response to the increase in environmental volatility. What is 
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efficiently eliminated is the risk of a response that might bring about 
harmful or fatal consequences. Both these views appeal to our immediate 
intuition. It can be tested whether or not people tend to resort to 
increasingly simple and clear rules in an increasingly complex and volatile 
environment.  
Vanberg’s version of rule-individualism appears beneficial in that it 
emphasises that a choice is always interconnected with the sequence of 
past choices. It argues that a choice is essentially a historical 
phenomenon, not something ahistorical and unconnected as viewed in 
the rational choice theory. The approach chosen here builds upon 
Vanberg’s version on rule-individualism and suggests that a choice about 
which rule to follow is not limited to the consequential assessment. 
Insofar as a choice among rules requires interpretation, it is the 
interpretation based on the procedural interest that can explain which 
rule is applied in a particular situation.  
The rationale for the conjecture about the presence of non-
consequential interests emerges from the inherent inconsistency of rule-
individualism. If the cognitive limitations explain rule following, then 
what explains case-by-case adjustment? If cognitive limitations do not 
explain rule following, and a choice among rules is based on rational 
expectations of the comparative consequences of both rule following 
and case-by-case adjustment, the assumption about human capacity 
becomes unrealistic. Neither version seems satisfactory.  
A weakness of the procedural interests explanation might be that it 
is difficult to imagine choice behaviour that is not directed toward 
consequences of some sort. Searching for a proper rule and a proper 
interpretation of that rule in the particular context can be said to be 
consequential in the sense that the outcome that is aimed at is the 
correspondence between action and the rule that is considered proper. It 
might deserve mentioning that the notion of procedural interest does not 
aim at rejecting the idea of purposeful behaviour. The essential point 
remains that procedural interests describe preferences that give rise to a 
different type of choice behaviour than in consequential reasoning. A 
rational precommitment to long-term expectations at the cost of a short-
term alternative is part of our daily decision-making. Empirical findings 
suggest, however, that human beings are equipped with a strong status 
quo preference that manifests itself at all levels of rules, from the personal 
to the social (Schlicht 1998). In her book The March of Folly, Barbara 
Tuchman examines historical incidents which brought about destruction, 
even though anyone with any sense at all would have easily been able to 
foresee the consequences. Procedural interests are consistent with status 
quo preferences but are not limited to them. The emphasis on the 
interpretative aspect of the search for a proper rule and its proper 
application may require mental exercise that exceeds the status quo 
preference explanation.  
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
References 
 
 
Axelrod, Robert (1984) The Evolution of Co-operation. New York: Basic 
Books. 
 
Coleman, James S. (1990) Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge: 
Belknap. 
 
Dosi, G., L. Marengo, A. Bassanini, M. Valente (1999) Norms as 
Emergent Properties of Adaptive Learning: The Case of 
Economic Routines. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 9, 5-26.  
 
Elster, Jon (1979) Ulysses and the Sirens. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Elster, Jon (1986) (ed.) Rational Choice. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
 
Hayek, F. A. (1952) The Sensory Order. An Inquiry into the Foundations of 
Theoretical Psychology. London: Routledge & Kegan. 
 
Hayek, F. A. (1967) Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. London: 
Routledge & Kegan. 
 
Hayek, F. A. (1973) Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 1, Rules and Order. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.   
 
Hayek, F. A. (1978) New studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the 
History of Ideas. London: Routledge & Kegan.  
 
Heiner, Ronald (1983) The Origin of Predictable Behavior. The American 
Economic Review, 73 (4), 560-95. 
 
Popper, Karl R. (1972) Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Rowe, Nicholas (1989) Rules and Institutions. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
 
Schlicht, Ekkehart (1998) On Custom in the Economy. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press.  
 
Simon, Herbert A. (1955) A Behavioural Model of Rational Choice. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69 (1), 99-118. 
 
16 
 
Simon, Herbert A. (1978) Rationality as Process and as Product of 
Thought. The American Economic Review, 68 (2), 1-16.  
 
Vanberg, Viktor (1994) Rules and Choice in Economics. London: Routledge.  
